34 ideas
| 3240 | There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel] |
| 3242 | Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel] |
| 21970 | Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte] |
| 3241 | It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel] |
| 5437 | The claim of hermeneutics to give knowledge through understanding is challenged by positivism [Mautner on Dilthey] |
| 20989 | Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel] |
| 22354 | Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 3248 | Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel] |
| 6912 | For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach] |
| 21973 | Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW] |
| 21914 | We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte] |
| 20951 | The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie] |
| 21964 | Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte] |
| 21968 | Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte] |
| 3249 | Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel] |
| 22429 | We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel] |
| 3247 | Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel] |
| 3252 | Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel] |
| 3251 | Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel] |
| 5436 | Natural science seeks explanation; human sciences seek understanding [Dilthey, by Mautner] |
| 3244 | Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel] |
| 3245 | The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel] |
| 3246 | I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel] |
| 21965 | Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte] |
| 3257 | Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel] |
| 3265 | We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel] |
| 3263 | If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel] |
| 3256 | Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel] |
| 3261 | Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel] |
| 3258 | If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel] |
| 3254 | If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel] |
| 3264 | We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel] |
| 3255 | We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel] |
| 3262 | Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel] |